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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF

Po-

AcTIVITY-Watkins v. United States RE-EXAMINED-The
scope of congressional investigations has expanded in recent years
from traditional areas of legislative fact finding and government
malfunction to include that of exposure of political deviation from
an established norm. In an era when departure from accepted
modes of political thought may have harsh results for the deviant,
serious questions have arisen concerning the propriety as well as
the power of Congress to expose those individuals. While the Fifth
Amendment remains an established bulwark against incriminating inquiries,1 it is no protection against unwarranted inferences
which the public may draw from its use.2 In Watkins v. United
States3 the Supreme Court gave strong evidence of limiting the
congressional power to compel testimony in the political area,
both by suggesting that the First Amendment would bar inquiries
by the committee in question, and by adopting a broad interpretation of the statutory requirement that Congress may compel
testimony only by questions "pertinent to the question under inquiry."4 However in Barenblatt v. United States,5 the Court has
held that the First Amendment is not a valid ground for refusing
to answer questions proposed by a congressional investigating committee in the area of Communist activity. It is the function of this
comment to examine the traditional scope and limitations of congressional investigations, with particular emphasis on these two
cases.6
LITICAL

1 The use of the Fifth Amendment privilege in congressional investigatory hearings
has been consistently upheld. E.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak
v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Blau
v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950). But cf. United States v. Thomas, (W.D. Ky. 1943)
49 F. Supp. 547 (immunity destroys the privilege); note, 35 MARQ. L. REv. 282 at 286 (1952).
2 CAUGHEY, IN CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER 123-133 (1958). It has been argued that
when a witness exercises the privilege an inference of guilt is entirely permissible. HooK,
COMMON SENSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1957). The contrary view is expressed by
GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955).
3 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
4 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. (1958) §192. For the enitre text of the statute, see note
59 infra.
o 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
6 On this subject, see, generally, "Congressional Investigations-A Symposium," 18
UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 421 (1951); McGeary, "The Congressional Power of Investigation," 28
NEB. L. REv. 516 (1949); Nutting, "Freedom of Silence," 47 MICH. L. REv. 181 (1948);
Landis, "Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation," 40
HARV. L. REv. 153 (1926); notes, 70 HARv. L. REv. 671 (1957); 65 YALE L.J. 1159 (1956).
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SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATORY POWER

Congress' power to investigate and to compel testimony in
connection with the investigation is not explicitly stated in the
Constitution. However, as early as 1821 the Supreme Court recognized that an implied power to investigate was essential to the
enumerated powers of government.7 Like any other implied
power,8 requirements have arisen that the investigation must be
in conjunction with and reasonably necessary to some explicit
power. In Kilbourn v. Thompson,9 the Court ruled that Congress
could not compel testimony when the particular investigation
could not possibly be connected to any valid congressional purpose.
While the opinion has often been cited for the principle that Congress has no "general power of making inquiry into the private
affairs of the citizen,"10 subsequent cases have refused to extend
the doctrine to cover investigations authorized for valid legislative
purposes. In McGrain v. Daugherty,11 the Court explicitly held
that the mere fact that the information required was private was
not sufficient to deprive the government of the right of knowing of
it, if the information was pertinent and in aid of its constitutional
power. This holding was approved in Sinclair v. United States,1 2
and has been universally followed.
7 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821) (attempted bribe of a legislator). Until
1857, trying the accused before the bar of the Senate or House was the accepted procedure.
At that time, contempt was made a statutory offense: 11 Stat. 156 (1857). The constitutionality of the act was upheld in In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897). The present form
of the act is nearly unchanged: 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. (1958) §192. For an analysis
of the differences in contempt trials and proceedings at the bar of Congress, see United
States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
s The implied powers of the Constitution were recognized by Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819). See Dodd, "Implied Powers and
Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law," 29 YALE L.J. 137 (1919).
9103 U.S. 168 (1880). The case arose out of an investigation of the failure of a
banking firm which was a depository of federal funds. For the authorizing resolution of
the committee, see 4 CoNG. REc. 598 (1876).
10 103 U.S. 168 at 190; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 at 294 (1929); McGrain
v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 at 173-174 (1927). Accord: Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins,
317 U.S. 501 (1943); Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 at 478 (1894)
(administrative agencies exercising adjudicatory and rule making function).
11273 U.S. 135 (1927).
12 279 U.S. 263 at 294 (1929). This case was an outgrowth of the scandals surrounding
the granting of oil leases at Teapot Dome during the Harding administration. The
validity of investigations in this area was clearly recognized by the Court: "Congress has
plenary power to • • • make all needful rules and regnlations respecting the • • . public
lands and property of the United States. And undoubtedly the Senate had power to
delegate authority to its committee to investigate and report what had been and was being
done by the executive departments .•• and to make any other inquiry concerning the
public domain."
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In light of the McGrain holding, one writer has gone so far as
to suggest that the Kilbourn case has been overruled.13 While it
would be unfair to say that the restrictive view of the Kilbourn
case is no longer recognized as applied to similar fact situations, it
is clear that a continual broadening of the concept of a valid legislative purpose has rendered the possibility of a direct application of
the case a negligible one. In McGrain v. Daugherty,1 4 a district
court holding that the mere mention of legislation as "an afterthought" could not validate the investigation was specifically overruled.15 In its opinion, the Supreme Court made it clear that once
any indication of a congressional purpose was found in the authorizing resolution, a presumption immediately arose as to the
validity of the proceedings.16 The use of a judicial presumption
of validity of the investigation would- seem wise in light of the
nearly impossible burden on the government, in some cases, to
prove a valid legislative purpose. This is especially true since some
courts have conceded that in certain areas, the power of investigation may be broader than the congressional power from which it
flows.17 One federal court has gone to the point of presuming the
validity of the subject matter itself,18 contrary to the McGrain
doctrine, which would at least examine the subject matter before
invoking the presumption. With this suggested modification,
every congressional investigation for any purpose would be presumed valid. This approach has not as yet been adopted by any
other tribunal.
13 Cousens, "The Purpose and Scope of Investigation Under Legislative Authority,"
26 GEO. L.J. 905 at 918 (1938).
14 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
15 Ex parte Daugherty, (S.D. Ohio 1924) 299 F. 620. For a discussion of both district
and Supreme Court opinions in the McGrain case, see note, 41 MINN. L. R.Ev. 622 at 624
(1957).
16 "The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation
was to aid in legislating; and we think the subject-matter was such that the presumption
should be indulged that this was the real object." 273 U.S. 135 at 178 (1927). It has been
suggested that the reason for the Court's reluctance to examine the nature of the proceedings was respect for the committee's long record of effective service in ridding government of corruption. Note, 65 YALE L.J. 1159 (1956).
17While Congress may not legislate regarding primary elections, investigations in
the area are valid. Compare Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921) with Seymour
v. United States, (8th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 577. "There is a vast difference between the
necessities for inquiry and the necessities for action." Barsky v. United States, (D.C. Cir.
1948) 167 F. (2d) 241 at 247, cert. den. 334 U.S. 843 (1948). See also United States v.
Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948); note, 23 NoTRE
DAME LAWYER 353 at 354 (1948).
18 United States v. Bryan, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 58, revd. per curiam on other
grounds (D.C. Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 525, revd. on other grounds 339 U.S. 323 (1950).
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A. Legitimate Areas of Investigation
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized only two valid
congressional purposes for investigation: legislation,19 and the
composition and order of Congress itself.20 However, once Congress has authorized an investigation there seems to be no way to
show that the authorization is unconnected with one of these purposes. It is not necessary for Congress by its authorization to indicate what legislation will result from the inquiry.21 The mere
possibility that some legislation may ensue seems to be sufficient.::2
Nor does the fact that no valid legislation has previously originated
as a result of the committee's findings invalidate a continued
authorization.23 Even if the committee is operating in an area
where legislation would apparently be unconstitutional, one court
has suggested that the committee's findings may result in repeal of
unconstitutional legislation already existing, and is therefore
valid. 24 The result is that with the barest recital of congressional
purpose the areas of investigative activity have become nearly
limitless. Since the Kilbourn case, not one decision has held a
witness immune from contempt on the basis that the purpose of
the investigation was invalid.

B. The Presumption of Purpose
While the presumption of valid purpose prescribed in the
McGrain case has never been seriously challenged, the conclusiveness of the presumption has come under constant judicial scrutiny.
Basically, the question is whether the actions of the investigative
committee itself can destroy the presumption that it is acting
19 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (un-American activities); Sinclair
v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929) (public domain); Essgee Co. v. United States, 262
U.S. 151 (1923) (corporations); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (corporations); Smith
v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 245 U.S. 33 (1917) (interstate commerce); Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894) (interstate commerce).
20 Seymour v. United States, (8th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 577 (primary elections); Barry
v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929) (elections); In re Chapman, 166
U.S. 661 (1897) (grounds for expulsion).
21 United States v. Orman, (3d Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 148; McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135 at 177-178 (1927). Cf. People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463, 2 N.E.
615 (1885) (cited in McGrain v. Daugherty).
22 Barsky v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241, cert. den. 334 U.S. 843
(1948).
23 Townsend v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 352, cert. den. 303 U.S. 664
(1938).
24 United States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82 at 90-91, cert. den. 333
U.S. 838 (1948).

410

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

for valid congressional ends. To put the problem in its modern
context, can the statements and actions of committee members in
evaluating their function, as that of an exposing "grand jury" for
example,25 destroy the presumption that they are in fact performing a congressional function? This example clearly defines the
problem, since the courts have never expressly acknowledged the
existence of a congressional power of "exposure for exposure's
sake."26
In Sinclair v. United States,27 the Court indicated that there
were at least some limits of purpose, beyond which the committee
could not go and still retain the stamp of validity.28 However, the
Court decided that under the circumstances of the case, the committee had not significantly deviated from its authorized purpose.
In only one case have the committee's actions, at the time of hearing, been considered controlling as to the validity of the investigation. In United States v. Icardi,29 a prosecution for perjury,30 the
court held that a committee could not be considered as "competent" if it was not pursuing a legislative purpose at the time
when it secured the testimony, "even though that very testimony
be relevant to a matter which could be the subject of a valid legislative investigation."31 Other federal courts have taken exactly the
opposite position. In Morford v. United States3 2 the court held
that once the presumption of validity arises, "it cannot be rebutted
by impugning the motives of the individual members of the com25 E.g., "I serve notice on the un-American elements in this country now that this
'grand jury' will be in session to investigate un-American activities at all times." Remarks
of Rep. Rankin, 91 CONG. REC. 275 (1945). "[T]he House Committee on Un-American
Activities is empowered to explore and expose activities by un-American individuals and
organizations, which while sometimes being legal, are nevertheless inimical to our American concepts and our American future...•" H. Rep. 2742, 79th Cong., 2d sess., p. 16
(1947). See note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 416 (1947).
26 E.g., Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 at 200 (1957); Rumely v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 166 at 173,
affd. 345 U.S. 41 (1953); United States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82 at S9,
cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
27 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
28 Sinclair claimed that the committee was really attempting to publicize facts relating
to a pending court controversy and pointed to the committee's refusal to sustain his
motion to exempt such facts from the inquiry. The Court held that this was "not enough
to show that the committee intended to depart from the purpose to ascertain whether
additional legislation might be advisable." 279 U.S. 263 at 295 (1929).
29 (D.C. D.C. 1956) 140 F. Supp. 383. The case is discussed in comment, 9 STAN. L.
REv. 574 at 581 (1957).
ao For a comparison between perjury and contempt before congressional investigating,
committees, see comment, 9 STAN. L. REV. 574 at 581 (1957).
31 United States v. Icardi, (D.C. D.C. 1956) 140 F. Supp. 383 at 388. Cf. Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155 at 161 (1955).
a2 (D.C. Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 54, revd. on other grounds 339 U.S. 258 (1950).
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mittee." In Josephson v. United States,83 the court held that once
the authorization stated a valid purpose, that purpose became
established, "regardless of any statement by the Committee or its
members intimating the contrary." While the claim of invalid
purpose has been raised constantly in contempt proceedings, it has
never prevailed.
The Supreme Court has considered this problem extensively
in two recent decisions. In Watkins v. United States,84 the Court,
while stating that there was no congressional power "to expose for
the sake of exposure," also made it plain that the committee's
motives were not conclusive on the issue. In effect, the Court
made clear the distinction between the motives of Congress and
motives of the committee.35 The Court suggested that if Congress
itself had intended mere exposure, then the purpose would be
invalid.36 Although the discussion on this point was dictum, the
Court gave strong indication of substantially limiting investigative powers in the future through scrutiny of congressional motive
and authorization.37 However, in Barenblatt v. United States,38
the Court gives exactly the opposite impression. As in Watkins,
the Court points out that the motives of the committee are of no
consequence in determining validity of purpose. But in Barenblatt the Court disregarded congressional as well as committee
motives. The only test remaining, according to Barenblatt, is
whether or not Congress acts pursuant to its constitutional power.
If the authorizing resolution recites a valid purpose, whether or
not that is the real purpose, the investigation will be conclusively
(2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
354 U.S. 178 (1957).
35 "Their [committee members] motives would not vitiate an investigation which had
been instituted by a House of Congress if that assembly's legislative purpose is being
served." 354 U.S. 178 at 200 (1957).
36 "We have no doubt that there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of
exposure." Id. at 200.
37 Watkins may possibly be viewed as a high-water mark of a recent judicial trend
toward greater protection from committee investigation. Previous decisions were based
on more traditional limitations. E.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) (Fifth
Amendment); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (same); United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41 (1953) (statutory construction); United States v. Kamin, (D.C. Mass. 1956) 136
F. Supp. 791 (jurisdiction).
38 360 U.S. 109 (1959). Barenblatt had refused to answer questions as to his former
or present membership in the Communist party. His contempt conviction was affirmed by
the court of appeals, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 875. Certiorari was granted by the
Supreme Court, judgment vacated, and the case remanded for reconsideration in the light
of Watkins, 354 U.S. 930 (1957). Upon rehearing, the court of appeals reaffirmed by a
divided court, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 252 F. (2d) 129. Certiorari was again granted by the
Supreme Court, 356 U.S. 929 (1958).
33

34
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presumed to be valid.39 By this extension, in a case involving
First Amendment freedoms, the Court has flatly refused to recognize the statement in Watkins that "the mere semblance of a legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill
of Rights. 40
It cannot be denied that these two cases represent fundamentally different approaches to the problem.41 In Watkins the Court
was willing to minimize both the propriety and ability of Congress
to conduct investigations which result in little more than destruction of individual reputation. In Barenblatt the emphasis is
placed upon the necessity of allowing a means by which Congress
may gather information "over the whole range of national interests,
concerning which Congress might legislate or decide upon due
investigation not to legislate...." Once the need and the legality
of the power has been ascertained, the Court will refuse to deny it
merely because it has been abused in some instances.
The position of the Court in Barenblatt may be rationalized in
two ways. Were the Court ever to adopt the doctrine that the
varying motives of the committee, or even of Congress, could
vitiate an otherwise valid investigation, it would then be faced
with the nearly insurmountable difficulty of ascertaining what
those motives were in particular instances. In any committee,
there are bound to be men of differing motivation.42 In such a
situation the difficult problem of whose motives are controlling is
insoluble. The question of ascertaining the motives of Congress
as a whole verges on the impossible.
39 "So long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power, the Judiciary
lacks authority to_ intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of
that power." 360 U.S. 109 at 132 (1959). The discussion was not necessary as the court
of appeals had held that "the primary purposes of the inquiry were in aid of legislative
processes." (D.C. Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 875 at 881.
40 354 U.S. 178 at 198 (1957).
41 For an analysis of this difference in outlook, see Schwartz, "The Supreme Court1958 Term" 58 MICH. L. REv. 165 (1959).
42 For example, in one public hearing two members of the Un-American Activities
Committee took issue with each other over the methods employed. One, Rep. Clardy,
was seemingly interested in discreditipg the witness before the public and press present at
the hearings. Rep. Doyle, at least verbally, felt that such motivation was improper in
view of the legislatively ordained function of the committee. The following colloquy resulted when Rev. Jack McMichael was asked to identify a supposed past Communist
associate.
"Mr. Clardy: Would you know him if you saw him?
Rev. McMichael (Witness): I'll be glad to look at him.
Mr. Clardy: Answer my question: would you know him if you saw him?
Rev. McMichael: How can I answer that question? I'll let the record show that question-how unfair it is.
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Second, there is a feeling on the part of the Court that the
responsibility for insuring the usefulness of congressional committees should lie with the parent body of Congress and the population as a whole. To restrain an otherwise lawful use of the
legislative power because of an improper motive would be an
abuse of the judicial function. 43 Motives may be controlled by
Congress only in appointing to committees men truly dedicated
to legislative ends.
Thus the conclusion emerges that while the Court has previously enunciated tests to limit "exposure for exposure's sake," and
even currently has not explicitly recognized such a power, congressional committees do possess a power of exposure, often unconnected with the fact-finding process. Of course, the mere
reluctance of the courts to admit the power does not of itself indicate that it is undesirable. Throughout history some writers
have felt that informing the public is in itself a valid congressional
function. 44 But most commentators have agreed that the danger
that such a power could fall into irresponsible hands outweighs
whatever value it may represent to society.415
Mr. Clardy: If you were a truthful man, you would answer that question, sir.
Mr. Doyle: Well now, Mr. ChairmanRev. McMichael: What kind of a questionMr. Doyle: Just a minute now. I don't want to differ with my distinguished colleagues, but I submit that sort of statement by a member of this committee is highly
improper.
Mr. Clardy: I stand by it.
Mr. Doyle: It is highly improper at this time. We are not judges. We are here to
get the facts, whatever they are, and I think it is very unfortunate to have to disagree with
my colleagues, and yet I can't sit as a member of this committee and complacently be
silent when that sort of statement is made from the committee bench. I just can't be silent.
Mr. Clardy: You should be convinced by now, Mr. Doyle.
Mr. Doyle: That is all right. Whatever I am convinced of, I am not going to announce
from the bench before the hearing is over..•."
Hearings Regarding Jack R. Mcl\fichael, House Committee on Un-American Activities,
83d Cong., 1st sess., v. 2, p. 2771 (1953).
43 McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 at 55 (1904), quoted in Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 at 132-133 (1959).
44 "Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and
disposition of the administrative agents of the government, the country must remain in
embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it
should understand and direct. The informing function of Congress should be preferred
even to its legislative function." WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (1885). See,
also Liacos, "Rights of Witnesses Before Congressional Committees," 33 BoST. UNIV. L.
REv. 337 at 346 (1953); Herwitz and Mulligan, "The Legislative Investigating Committee,"
33 CoL. L. REv. I at 6, note 78 (1933).
45 See Justice Frankfurter's discussion in Rumely v. United States, 345 U.S. 41 at 4;3-44
(1952); Gellhorn, "Report on a Report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities," 60 HARv. L. REv. 1193 (1947); notes, 70 HAR.v. L. REv. 671 (1957); 65 YALE L.J. 1159
(1956); 47 CoL. L. REv. 416 (1947).
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LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF INVESTIGATION

While the original limitation of the Kilbourn case has become
nearly meaningless, some effective safeguards do remain. These
restrictions may be divided into two basic categories: jurisdictional limitations and limitations of pertinency.

A. Jurisdictional Limitations
Any examination of the jurisdictional limits of an inquiry assumes the fact that the authorizing resolution setting up the inquiry is within Congress' power. Once this is determined, it still
must be shown that the particular inquiry directed to a witness
falls within the scope of that authorizing resolution. 46 In United
States v. Kamin 41 it was held that the presumption of a valid legislative purpose does not apply in determining whether the committee has jurisdiction over a particular subject matter.48 But
even more important, while recognizing that the committee might
make some special inquiries outside of its jurisdiction "to the extent that such inquiry might cast light upon a subject over which it
does have jurisdiction," the court reserved the right to inquire into
the motives of the committee in deviating from their jurisdictional.
area. 49 In United States v. Lamont50 the court held an indictment
defective when the authorized function of the committee had no
apparent connection with the inquiry from which prosecution
46 The authority of all investigating committees is prescribed by The Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946, c. 753, 60 Stat. 812, codified partially in 2 U.S.C. (Supp. III,
1956) §§72b-l, 190-190 (g), 198. The act allocates jurisdiction of subject matter among
the various committees, c. 753, §§102, 121, 60 Stat. 814, 822. While all standing commit•
tees of the Senate are clothed with permanent power to compel testimony and require
the production of documents, the only House Committee with such power is the UnAmerican Activities Committee.
47 (D.C. Mass. 1956) 136 F. Supp. 791.
48 The investigation was conducted by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Senate Committee on Government Operation, under authority given by The Leg•
islative Reorganization Act of 1946, c. 753, §102 (g): "(2) Such committee shall have the
duty of .••
(B) Studying the operation of Government activities at all levels with a view to
determining its economy and efficiency."
Questions directed to the witness regarding private manufacturers holding defense contracts
with the federal government were considered prima fade outside the limit of the committee's jurisdiction. United States v. Kamin, (D.C. Mass. 1956) 136 F. Supp. 791 at 804. See
also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 at 176 (1927) (dictum); Barsky v. United States,
(D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241 at 246, cert. den. 334 U.S. 843 (1948) (dictum). Cf.
Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942); Doidge v. Cunard S.S. Co., (1st Cir. 1927) 19 F.
(2d) 500 at 502 (jurisdiction of federal courts is never presumed but must affirmatively
appear).
40 United States v. Kamin, (D.C. Mass. 1956) 136 F. Supp. 791 at 804.
50 (2d Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 312.
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arose, and jurisdiction was not affirmatively alleged by the government. The court recognized that "the result might be different"
if the inquiry in question was apparently within the authority of
the committee.51
Recent cases have indicated, however, that jurisdictional
bounds will be extremely difficult to delimit in the future. In the
Barenblatt case, the Court recognized that the authorizing statute
of the Un-American Activities Committee,52 criticized harshly in
the Watkins case for its vagueness,53 was sufficient to confer upon
the committee the power to investigate Communist activities. In
ascertaining the intent of Congress, the court considered repeated
re-authorization of and appropriation for the committee by Congress as indirect approval of the investigation.54 While such indirect approval may be sufficient in some circumstances, the
wisdom of the type of analysis seems doubtful where the authorized
power conflicts with First Amendment freedoms. 55 The reluctance of the court to limit strictly the areas of investigation seems
to be based on interpretation of legislative policy. One of the
purposes of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 194656 was to
establish permanent committees with broad powers, so that ad hoc
committees would not have to be established to investigate related
areas with resulting duplication and waste. To construe the au51 See United States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 333 U.S.
838 (1948) (un-American activities); Bowers v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d)
447 (organized crime in interstate commerce). But cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S.
41 at 44 (1953) (lobbying).
52 "The Committee on Un-American Activities ••• is authorized to make •.. investigations of (I) the extent, character and objects of un-American propaganda activities in
the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and
attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and
(3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation." H. Res. 5, Rule XI, §17 (b), 83d Cong., 1st sess., 99 CoNG. REc. 18 (1953).
For a discussion of the inherent vagueness of the statute, as well as some legislative attempts
at definition, see note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 416 (1947).
53 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 at 202 (1957). The enormous range of
activity covered by the authorization is evidenced to some extent by the organizations the
committee has investigated since its inception. For a partial list, see United States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82 at 95 (dissenting opinion), cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
54 The House of Representatives extended the life of the special committee five times:
H. Res. 26, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 84 CoNG. R.Ec. 1098 at 1127-1128 (1939); H. Res. 321, 76th
Cong., 3d sess., 86 CoNG. REc. 572 (1940); H. Res. 90, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 87 CoNG. REC.
886, 899 (1941); H. Res. 420, 77th Cong., 2d sess., 88 CONG. REC. 2282, 2297 (1942); H. Res.
65, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 89 CoNG. REc. 795, 809-810 (1943). This was done with full knowledge that the committee was-spending the major part of its time investigating communism.
E.g., H. Rep. 2, 76th Cong., 1st sess. (1939); H. Rep. 2233, 79th Cong., 2d sess. (1946).
5G See the opinion of Justice Black, dissenting in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109 at 140, note 7 (1959).
56 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812.
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thorized jurisdiction of the committees strictly would be to fly
directly in the face of the act, and the Court has apparently felt that
government efficiency outweighs the individual interest in having
jurisdiction more specifically defined.57
B. The Requirement of Pertinency

Conviction under 2 U.S.C. §19258 can result only if a witness
refuses to answer questions which are "pertinent to the question
under inquiry." The term "pertinency" has never been authoritatively defined and, while it is generally equated to relevancy,
the precise degree of relevancy has not been agreed upon. Some
courts have suggested that nearly any degree of relevance will make
the question pertinent, even though the question would not be
relevant under the rules of evidence.59 Another decision has suggested that in order to be pertinent a question must be in some
degree "material." 60 While "material" is as elusive a term as
"pertinency," it does at least suggest a stronger relationship between question and inquiry than that of mere relevancy. In a
prosecution for perjury, one court has gone so far as to hold that
material questions are those to which answers might be capable of
influencing the tribunal on the issue being considered. 61 Questions asked purely to trap the witness into a perjured statement
though possibly relevant to the subject of the investigation, were
not considered "material." This suggests that "materiality" may
be judged in light of the committee's motive in asking the question.
This test has never been adopted by a court in a contempt proceedmg.
Whatever standards are used it is clear that possible answers,
not necessarily the true answer, to the question will determine its
7

57 However, Congress seems to have suggested that too vague a definition of jurisdic•
tion would also result in waste and duplication of function. S. Rep. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d
sess., p. 5 (1946). See also note, 70 HARV. L. R.Ev. 67r (1957).
58 "Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either
House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry
before ••. any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who,
having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.•.." 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. (1958) §192.
59 Compare United States v. Orman, (3d Cir.1953) 207 F. (2d) 148 and Townsend
v. Uni~ed States, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 352 at 361, with I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed.,
§§31-32 (1941; Supp. 1957).
60 Bowers v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 447. See also Senate debate on
the original contempt statute: CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d sess., 439-441 (1857) (favoring
a rigorous test).
61 United States v. Icardi, (D.C. D.C. 1956) 140 F. Supp. 383. See also Fraser v. United
States, (6th Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 145 at 149, cert. den. 324 U.S. 842 (1945).
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pertinency.62 While the witness must reach his own conclusion
as to pertinency, 63 subject to later judicial review, the courts are
uniform in holding that the witness must have a fair opportunity
to make that decision; he is entitled to have knowledge of the
subject to which the interrogation is deemed pertinent. 64 Information from which the witness may make his conclusion must
be available at the time of the hearing, not at the time of trial, 05
and it "must be available with the same degree of explicitness and
clarity that the Due Process Clause requires in the expression of
any element of a criminal offense." 66
In Watkins v. United States,61 the Court held that the pertinency of the question must be made to appear "undisputably
clear" to the witness and suggested three sources from which the
information may be derived: (I) the authorizing resolution creating the committee, 68 (2) the remarks of the chairman or members
of the committee, and (3) the nature of the proceedings themselves. 00 The last two sources have been mentioned generally in
situations where the authorizing resolution is insufficient to give
the proper amount of information.
The use of the authorizing resolution as a means of notification
has resulted in much difficulty. Under the statute "pertinency"
relates only to the "question under inquiry." Prior to the establishment of contempt as a statutory offense, the "question under
inquiry" was entirely defined by the authorization of the committee. Investigations were conducted by ad hoc committees,
whose investigations encompassed the full limit of their authority.70 With the broadening of investigatory authorizations, the
"question under inquiry" and the jurisdictional reach of the committee have become separate and distinct entities. As the test for
62 United States v. Orman, (3d Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 148; Sinclair v. United States,
279 U.S. 263 (1929).
63 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 at 200 (1957); Sinclair v. United States, 279
U.S. 263 at 299 (1929); United States v. Kamin, (D.C. Mass. 1956) 135 F. Supp. 382.
<l4 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 at 209 (1957); United States v. Rumely, 345
U.S. 41 at 45.47 (1953).
65 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 at 45.47 (1953).
oo Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 at 208-209 (1957). See also Scull v. Virginia,
359 U.S. 344 (1959); Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147 (1958).
01354 U.S. 178 (1957).
es E.g., Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 at 613 (1929). Some
members of Congress seem to feel that the authorization is exclusively controlling on
pertinency. See remarks of Rep. Sherry in debate on H.R. 151, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 101
CoNG. REc. 3569 (1955). But see Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
<l9 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 at 209-215 (1957).
70 Landis, "Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation,"
40 HAR.v. L. REv. 153 at 170-190 (1926) and cases therein cited.
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jurisdiction has nothing at all to do with notification of pertinency
to the witness,71 the authorization should not be tested for its
notification qualities. Its function is that of prescribing the area
in which "questions under inquiry" may fall, and it is only those
"questions under inquiry" that must be made clear to the witness.
Moreover, severe problems result if the authorization is considered as one source of notice. The contempt statute is of a
criminal nature, and therefore must be judged by criminal standards.72 If an investigation of pertinency will relate back to the
authorization, that authorization should have to be sufficiently
specific to meet criminal tests. But this would make the establishment of permanent committees with broad powers nearly impossible, contrary to the policy of the Legislative Reorganization Act.73
In recognition of the problem, one court has frankly refused to
measure the authorization by criminal standards74 and, while
other courts have purported to do so, it is significant that with one
exception75 the supposed vagueness of an authorization has never
prevailed as a conclusive defense in a prosecution for contempt.
Barenblatt is the first case to make a realistic distinction between the jurisdictio~al test and the requirements of pertinency.
In considering whether or not the committee had jurisdiction, the
Court examined the authorization in the light of its legislative
history, of which the witness probably had little knowledge. 76 But
in considering the witness's contention that he had not been aprised of the pertinency of the question, the Court considered only
statements by the committee at the time and the conduct of the
witness.77 It concluded that together they made the question appear with "undisputable clarity."
71 See

text at notes 46 through 57 supra.
penal statute must be phrased in such terms that its words have either (a) a
technical meaning known to those within their reach; (b) an obvious common law meaning; or (c) a meaning settled by other words in the statute. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 at 391 (1926); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S.
81 (1921; note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 416 at 429 (1947).
73 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812.
74 United States v. Bryan, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 58 at 63. But cf. M. Kraus &
Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614 at 620 (1946).
75 United States v. Peck, (D.C. D.C. 1957) 154 F. Supp. 603. The decision seems to be
based on a misinterpretation of the Watkins case. See 154 F. Supp. 603 at 608.
76 Note 55 supra. Justice Black, dissenting, argued that these sources were invalid for
purposes of ascertaining pertinency, a typical indication of the confusion which may
easily result.
77 Five sources of notice were mentioned: (1) the chairman's opening statement, (2)
the statement at the commencement of the investigation, (3) petitioners previous attendance at the hearings, (4) the fact that petitioner stood mute in the face of the chairman's
statement as to why he had been called as a witness, and (5) the fact that questions were
directed at the witness's own affiliations, rather than those of others. Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 at 124-125 (1959).

72 A
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While a clear distinction between the test for jurisdiction and
the test for pertinency may be desirable, it may also lead to some
disturbing conclusions. Legislative policy dictates judicial tolerance of vague and indeterminate authorizing resolutions. Within
the broad jurisdictional framework, the committee is free to select
particular areas of inquiry, and to compel testimony pertinent
to that area. The particular subjects of inquiry selected may not,
in all cases, correspond to those which Congress had in mind in
authorizing the investigation. The power to conduct the investigation has been substantially separated from the direction and responsibility of the investigation. Such separation was condemned in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,78 under the due process clause. A recent decision, 79 however, has seemingly restricted the Sweezy case
to the concurring opinion which based the holding upon the
ground that New Hampshire's interest was insufficient to overbalance defendant's First Amendment rights.80
The results of the separation are twofold. First, pertinency
may no longer be generally represented as justifying compulsory
testimony by evidencing a close nexus with congressional interest.
The justification must now be based on a broad statement of congressional purpose, coupled with a specific committee interest.
Secondly, the protection for a witness has become minimal. While
questions must be pertinent to a subject of inquiry, the requirement loses its effectiveness when there are many questions of inquiry upon which a committee may compel testimony. Questions
not pertinent to a subject under inquiry may be redefined by
subsequently changing the subject, and if the circumscription
governing the choice of subjects is vague, a change is easily made.
The result may be that "pertinency" no longer has meaning as a
protection from inquiry, now serving only as a protection from
confusion.
Perhaps an equally significant departure from established notions of contempt proceedings is the recent suggestion that the
claim of pertinency may be waived by the witness's failure to object
78 354 U.S. 234 at 253 (1957): "It is •.• clear that the basic discretion of determining
the direction of the legislative inquiry has been turned over to the investigating agency.
The Attorney General has been given such a sweeping and uncertain mandate that it is
his decision which picks out the subjects that will be pursued, what witnesses will be summoned and what questions will be asked." See also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
at 205 (1957) (dictum). But cf. United States v. Bryan, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 58.
79 Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). The same New Hampshire authorization
was involved in both cases, N.H. Laws 1953, c. 307.
so Sweezy v. United States, 354 U.S. 234 at 256 (1957).
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at the time of inquiry.81 Traditionally, pertinence was considered
an element of the offense which had to be proved by the prosecution82 and which could not be waived. Though one recent case has
specifically held that there is no doctrine of waiver,83 the Supreme
Court has suggested by way of allusion that such a doctrine does
in fact exist.84 If so, it may be a departure from the view that a
congressional contempt prosecution is to be treated like any other
criminal proceeding. In light of the purpose underlying the investigative process, a doctrine of waiver has no rational basis whatsoever. Whatever the basis of the refusal of the witness to answer
the question; there is no reason to uphold contempt proceedings
against him unless there was some purpose to be fulfilled by his
answering. If the committee, confronted with the witness's refusal
to reply, did not demonstrate pertinency, the significance of the
question would seem to be negated.85

Ill.

PROTECTION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In the field of political inquiry, reluctant witnesses searching
for means to protect their names and reputations have generally
relied upon the Fifth Amendment,86 or the claim of lack of pertinency. With the adoption of the term "Fifth Amendment Communist," one of the most precious of our freedoms has, as a practical
matter, lost much of its original meaning. The solution for some
witnesses, faced with pertinent questions, has been a flat denial of _
the committee's right to inquire into the area of political belief
and association, an argument grounded on the First Amendment's
prohibitions.
81 Barenblatt v. United States, !!60 U.S. 109 at 12!!-124 (1959). See also United States
v. Kamin, (D.C. Mass. 1956) 1!!6 F. Supp. 791 (dictum); United States v. Bryan, (D..C.
D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 58. But see Bowers v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 195!!) 202 F. (2d) 447.
82 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 26!! at 296-297 (1929). See also Christoffel v.
United States, !!!!8 U.S. 84 (1949) (objection to lack of a quorum need not be raised at a
time of hearing), distinguished in United States v. Bryan, !!!!9 U.S. !!23 at 329 (1950).
83 Bowers v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 447.
84 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 at 123-124 (1959).
85 lf the committee is sincerely interested in obtaining the testimony there is little
doubt that they will attempt to show pertinency, whether or not the witness objects on
that grounds. If they fail to indicate the question's relevance, the conclusion follows that
their main purpose in asking the question is to trap the witness into grounds for contempt
proceedings. To require an indication of pertinency, whether or not the witness objects,
would seem a valid limitation on these particularly flagrant cases of exposure. See note,
41 MINN. L. REv. 622 at 637 (1957).
86 See note 1 supra.
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A. The Policy of the First Amendment
While perhaps a preferred right,87 freedom of speech has never
been considered an absolute one.88 Limitations of the right were
originally grouped in two classes, dependent upon the nature of
the speech. First, if the language was such that it would tend to
provoke a criminal act, limitations only of proximity and degree
were placed upon the utterances. The words must be "of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent." 89
The doctrine was clarified in a subsequent case in which it was
stated that the danger must be so "imminent" that "it may befall
before there is an opportunity for full discussion." 00
The second category of limitation was prescribed in Gitlow v.
New York, 01 where the Court was faced with a statute which made
speech itself criminal. In this situation, the Court deviated from
a clear and present danger test, and instead suggested that so long
as the language has a tendency to create an evil which the state
may legally prohibit, then the speech itself may be made criminal,
providing there is a "reasonable" relationship between the speech
and the state power to regulate the evil.
Recent decisions have indicated that there is little if any
merit left in the original distinction because, perhaps, of the difficult classification of restraining statutes.92 The current test seems
to be that of balancing the public interest in curtailing the speech
87 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 at 529-530 (1945) (speech and assembly); West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 629 (1943) (religion);
Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (assembly); Cahn, "The Firstness of the First
Amendment," 65 YALE L.J. 464 (1956); CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941).
But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
88 E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Smith Act); American Communications Assn., C.1.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (non-Communist affidavits); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (criminal anarchy); note, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1208 at 12091210 (1948). But see the opinion of Justice Black in Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
(1952).
89 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 at 52 (1919). The evil must be sufficiently
grave to justify oppression: Terroiniello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I (1949); Craig v. Hamey,
331 U.S. 367 at 373, 378 (1947); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 at 378-379 (1927)
(concurring opinion).
90 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 at 377 (1927) (concurring opinion). See also
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 at 334 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 at
262 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 at 104-106 (1940).
91268 U.S. 652 (1926). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
92 In particular, the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670 (1940), now IS U.S.C. (1958) §2385 defines
as criminal both advocacy and particular overt acts connected with that advocacy. See
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

422

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

against the individual's interest in preserving it.93 While courts
often speak of "clear and present danger," few actually employ the
test. 94
The balancing test has been criticized as failing to differentiate
between two fundamental interests involved in the concept of free
speech. One is the personal right of each individual affected by a
curtailment. The second, and seemingly more important, is "the
social interest in the attainment of truth." 95 The majority of the
Court has generally disregarded the second interest in its balancing
test. 96 In opposition to the Court's position, it may be cogently
argued that the prohibitions of the First Amendment were adopted
to protect and foster the free flow of ideas, a concept which loses all
efficacy when considered purely from an individual viewpoint.
Four of the members of the current Court appear to base their test
on this enlarged concept, which verges closely on an absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment.97
B. The Application of the First Amendment to
Legislative Inquiries

I. Generally. The extension of the prohibitions of the amendments to investigations as well as "laws" which abridge free speech
is but a logical extension of the doctrine that any government
93 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (investigation of Communist activities); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (criminal libel act); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Smith Act); American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (non-Communist affidavits from labor leaders); Barsky v.
United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241, cert. den. 334 U.S. 843 (1948) (investigation
of Communist activities).
94 "No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase 'clear and present danger' or how
closely we hyphenate the words, they are not a substitute for the weighing of values. They
tend to convey a delusion of certitude when what is most certain is the complexity of
the strands in the web of freedom which the judge must disentangle." FREUND, ON UNDER·
STANDING THE SUPREME COURT 27-28 (1949), quoted in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 at 542-543 (1951); note, 101 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 870 at 871 (1953). But see Barsky v.
United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241 at 246, cert. den. 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
95 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (dissent of Justice Black); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (dissent of Justice Holmes); Meiklejohn, "What Does the First
Amendment Mean?" 20 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 461 (1953); CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES 33, 34, (1941); note, 29 IND. L.J. 162 (1954).
96 The preoccupation with individual interest may be grounded in the Court's reluctance to allow one individual to raise the constitutional rights of others. E.g., United
States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82 at 90, cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948);
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). But see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 at 255-259 (1953); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 at 183-187 (1951); comment, 27 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 656 (1952).
97 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan. See dissenting opinions in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) and Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72
(1959). Justice Black's language in Barenblatt strongly suggests that no public interest
could ever overbalance the interest in the free exchange of ideas. 360 U.S. 109 at 144-145.
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interference with the guaranteed freedoms will be considered
"abridgement" within the meaning of the amendment.98 That
the amendment applies specifically to investigative actions has
been assumed by the present Court to be settled.99
Equally clear is the recognition that though the amendment is
couched in terms of speech, it applies to political activity as well.100
Some writers have suggested that the protection of the "political
process," involving both belief and activity, was the fundamental
purpose behind the amendment.101 In defining political activity,
the Court has been quick to realize that "effective advocacy of both
public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones,
is undeniably enhanced by group association."102
Whether "exposing" an individual to the ·wrath of the community is "interference" or "abridgment" of his political activity
and belief is not entirely settled. There can be little doubt that
exposure of a witness may have disastrous effects upon his life,
effects amounting to a penalty for that political conduct.103 Although the effects are the result of private action, uncontrolled by
the First Amendment,104 it would be unrealistic to refuse to recognize the government's role in the overall result. The majority of
cases have recognized that the inhibition of speech and political
affiliation caused by fear of exposure does constitute an "abridgment" of speech within the confines of the amendment.105 The
substantiality of government action in the matter, while still re98Abridgments which have been invalidated have included licensing, Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); denial of government privileges, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); criminal statutes, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949);
and taxation, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES 9-31 (1948).
99 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957) (dictum); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (dictum). Cf. Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252 at 260, 263 (1941).
100 The Court has often indicated that of all freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment, political action is most highly protected. E.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
at 263 (1952); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 at 152-153 (1938);
Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 at 364-365 (1937).
101 E.g., Meiklejohn, "What Does the First Amendment Mean?" 20 UNIV. CHr. L.
R.Ev. 461 at 479 (1953).
·102NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 at 460 (1958). See, generally, Solter, "Freedom of
Association-A New and Fundamental Civil Right,'' 27 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 652 (1959).
103 See Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities on Blacklisting,
84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 5175-5419 (1956). See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 at
531 (1958); Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
104 Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 at 643-644 (1951).
105 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S.
612 (1954) (dictum); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (concurring opinion);
American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). Cf. Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155 at 161 (1955).
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quired in some degree, seemingly will be presumed if that action
is the initial one in the government-private action interplay.
2. Investigation of Un-American Activities. While committees entrusted with the function of investigation of un-American
activities have made infrequent glances at right-wing groups,106
the term has come to mean little more than investigation of the
Communist Party. Contempt proceedings originating from those
hearings have brought the question of First Amendment limitations on the committee constantly before the federal courts.107
The fundamental question the Court has been forced to decide
is that of the nature of the Communist Party. Traditionally, it
has not been considered as a merely political group. Either
through a policy of judicial notice or judicial restraint,10 8 the
Court has accepted the expressions of Congress that, regardless of
its political nature, the party is a conspiratorial and revolutionary
group, organized to reach ends and to use methods which are incompatible with our constitutional system.10° For this reason, the
Court has consistently refused to view the Communist Party in
the same light as any other organization, and has upheld legislation
aimed at it "which in a different context would certainly have
raised constitutional issues of the gravest character." While a
possible, if somewhat implausible, argument may be maintained
that the First Amendment was framed to protect even revolutionary groups,11° the discussion is one of purely academic significance, as the point is well settled.
But while differentiating between legitimate political activity
which is protected and Communist activity which is not, the Court
formerly recognized that the latter does not, of necessity, exclude
lOG Even during the Second World War, the Dies Committee ·scarcely glanced at
Fascist organizations, and seemingly was verbally supported by them. See Remarks of
Rep. Sadowski, 89 CONG. REc. 798 (1943).
107 E.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins '{- United States,
354 U.S. 178 (1957); Barsky v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241, cert. den.
334 U.S. 843 (1948); United States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den.
333 U.S. 838 (1948). The committee has also been responsible for one recognized bill of
attainder, United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
10s In Barenblatt, the Court considered the formal expression by Congress of the
aims of the Communist Party as partially determinative of its legitimacy. See Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950, Title I of Internal Security Act of 1950, §2, 64 Stat. 987-989.
For a critical analysis of the application of judicial restraint in the area of civil liberties,
see Beth, "Group Libel and Free Speech," 39 MINN. L. REv. 167 (1955).
109 American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at 422 (1950)
(concurring opinion of Justice Jackson).
110 Both Hamilton and Madison, the framers of the Bill of Rights, seem to have
recognized a right of revolution: HAMILTON, ~fADISON, AND JAY, THE FEDERALIST, ON TIIE
NEW CONSTITUTION, XXVIII, 135-136 (1788).
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the former. Justice Vinson, speaking for the Court in American
Communications Assn. v. Douds111 observed: "Communists, we
may assume, carry on legitimate political activities." Justice Jackson, concurring in the same case, pointed out that there was a
fundamental distinction between an oath requiring overt acts of
affiliation with the party and one which called for disclosure of
belief unconnected with any overt act.112 _In Wieman v. Updegrafj,113 the Court invalidated a loyalty oath because mere party
association was the determining factor; no distinction had been
made for innocent association. To inhibit individual freedom by
"indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity
must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power."114 In Dejonge v.
Oregon,m, a unanimous Court held that mere membership in or
presence at a Communist rally was not significant, unless some
criminal or violent act had been advocated there.
These cases seem to be a direct corollary to the "least abridgment" test of the First Amendment, which suggests that while the
legislature may limit First Amendment freedoms, the means of
curtailment must lead to the least possible abridgment of those
freedoms. 116 Under this policy, vaguely worded abridgments,
which have included conduct which could not be fully justified
by a public need, have been struck down.117 Least abridgment,
if applied to Communist activities, would mean that simple association or membership was too broad a category to be regulated.
It must be the particular aspects of membership that are a threat
to society that may be regulated.118
Barenblatt v. United States 119 is the first case directly involving
the effect of the First Amendment on congressional investigations

.s.

111 339 U
382 at 393 (1950).
112 Id. at 435-445.
11s 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
114 Id. at 191. But d. Adler v.

Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Gerende v.
Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951); Gamer v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716
(1951) (loyalty oaths upheld when scienter was implicitly required).
115 299 U.S. 353 (1937). See also Stamps, "Freedom of Assembly," 11 UNIV. KAN. CITY
L. R.Ev. 187 (1943).
116 In the following cases, abridgments were struck down as not being the least
restrictive means of achieving the desired end: Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 at 190
(1952); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 at 293-295 (1951) (lack of standards for grant of
license); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 at 307-308 (1940) (criminal law too encompassing); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 at 100 (1940) (criminal law too encompassing).
117 E.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Winter v. New York, 333
U.S. 507 (1948). Cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); United States v. c.r.o.,
335 U.S. 106 (1948).
118 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 at 148, note 16 (1959) (dissenting
opinion of Justice Black).
119 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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to be decided by the Supreme Court.120 The witness refused to
answer questions as to whether he was, or had ever been, a Communist. The Court, in upholding the committee's right to inquire
into this association, expressly rejected the claim that "because
the Communist Party may also sponsor peaceable political reforms
the constitutional issues before us should now be judged as if that
Party were just an ordinary political party...." 121 The Court has
thus clearly taken the view, with regard to congressional investigations, that although there may be a distinction between political
activity and overt criminal acts, the differentiation will not be
made within the framework of membership in the Communist
Party.
Although the Court refused to consider the party in the same
light as any other political group, it still recognized that the First
Amendment would afford protection in some situations. The
decision in the case was actually reached, not on the basis that the
Communist Party was not a legitimate group, but rather because
the public interest in disclosure was greater than the witness's interest in keeping silent.122 Therefore, the majority, while claiming that the party is not legitimate, does not seem to be entirely
convinced of the fact and has sought an alternative legal technique
to uphold its result.
Four members of the Court strongly dissented from the
opinion. Justice Black, writing for three of the dissenters, reasoned that neither the Communist Party nor the particular witness
lost the full protection of the First Amendment because one of the
party's aims was violent overthrow of the government. If the
Court was willing to recognize the party as legitimate, no public
need could ever justify abridgment of political beliefs and associations.123 While Justice Black has often been criticized for his
absolutist approach to the First Amendment, his rationale would
seem much more sensible in the area of political freedoms than in
that of speech.124 It is also significant that at least two, and possibly
three members of the Court joined Black in his interpretation.125
120 But see United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 at 47-48 (1953); United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 at 626 (1954) (restrictive statutory construction adopted to avoid
First Amendment problems). And see Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 at 161 (1955).
121 360 U.S. 109 at 128-129 (1959).
122 Id. at 126-128. For a discussion of "public interest," see Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 at 508-509 (1951).
123 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 at 140-153 (1959) (dissenting opinion of
Justice Black).
124 See notes 101 and 102 supra.
12:; Justices Douglas and Warren concurred in Black's dissent. Justice Brennan dissented separately on the ground that there was no congressional power of exposure for
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The decision in Barenblatt has restricted Watkins v. United
States126 to its barest holding-that of the pertinency of the question. In doing so, the Court has given enormous power to the UnAmerican Activities Committee, a power which the Court in
Watkins was loathe to confer. The Court has also indicated that
the balancing test is becoming more and more weighted toward the
government. In effect, the application of the First Amendment
has been restricted to currently "safe" political associations. The
difficulty with this rationale is that it leaves to the individual the
dangerous function of deciding for himself today what will be
considered "safe" by the government in the future. This cannot
but deter persons from engaging in unpopular political activity.
While it is true that the Court would undoubtedly distinguish
between unpopular and dangerous political activity, danger is
merely defined by government doctrine or even propaganda, and
it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain future governmental
policy. It must therefore be recognized that the Court's opinion
has made serious inroads into First Amendment limitations. If
protection is to be forthcoming for the reluctant witness, it will
not be a result of the very amendment framed to protect those
activities which he refused to disclose.
CONCLUSION

The Court's reluctance to interfere with the action of congressional committees may be grounded in the thesis that as committees perform an important and essential function of government, restrictions upon them should be kept to a minimum. The
dilemma the Court faces is how to lay down restrictions on irresponsible committees which would not apply with equal force to
responsible ones.
Assuming that some judicial control of investigatory methods
is desirable, there is a possibility of applying the due process
clause in certain situations. If "silence" is considered as a liberty,
it is clear that Congress could compel a witness to speak only by a
procedure suitable and proper to the particular situation. This
would involve the establishment by the Court of some basic concepts of "fairness" in committee hearings.127 The difficulty with
exposure's sake, but did not take issue with Black's analysis of the First Amendment. Cf.
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 at 82 (1959) (dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan); Scull
v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 at 353, note 7 (1959).
126 354

U.S. 178 (1957).
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this test is that it will inevitably involve an investigation of committee motives in questioning a witness.
An alternative solution is the establishment of basic procedural
limitations on committee action, an exercise of legislative self-control. Many proposals of this nature have been submitted,128 but
none has received serious consideration, probably because of the
basic belief that an irresponsible committee could best be cured
"not by differences in rules but in differences of men."129 The
decline of the activities of the House Un-American Activities Committee in recent years may also have contributed to congressional
laxity. However, the possible revival of such activity demands a
congressional reappraisal of committee procedure.
A final possibility is that of discarding the balancing test completely and enforcing the prohibitions of the First Amendment
absolutely in the area of political activity. The result of a strict
interpretation of the amendment may not be as chaotic as some
might imagine. By restricting the absolute prohibitions to the
political area, the way is left open for control of non-political
speech. The result in the political sphere would not be to deny
the nation its right of self-preservation; rather it would require a
more specific definition of those abuses the nation seeks to preserve
itself from. Acts of subversion would still remain open to curtailment and investigation, but guilt by association, either judicially
or publicly, would be foreclosed. Congress might still seek information regarding treason or espionage, but it could not act indirectly by equating the abuse to a political party, and then seeking
information regarding the party. To do so is to supplant the
policy of the First Amendment with a vague probability ratio,
which even if nearly conclusive is still no justification for inquiry
into political association. Criminal sanctions remain available for
those members of a group who act outside our governmental
framework, but the First Amendment should remain a bulwark
of protection for those who work within it.

Avrum M. Gross, S.Ed.
127 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 at 191 (1952); note, 47 MICH. L. REv. 181 at
219 (1948). Cf. Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 at 410 (1915).
12s E.g., H.R. 4564, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947). For a summary of proposed legislation, see Meader, "Limitation on Congressional Investigation," 47 MICH. L. REv. 775
(1949); note, 23 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 353 (1948). See also procedural rules suggested by
Wyzanski, J., reprinted in 94 CONG. REc. A 1547 (1948).
120 94 CoNG. REc. A 1547 (1948).

